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1 Introduction
When I began to research for this epilogue to the tenth anniversary issue of the
Journal of Politeness Research, my aim was to chart some of the key develop-
ments in the theorization of (im)politeness that had taken place over the past
ten years in order to draw out the methodological impact of these re-theoriza-
tions. My initial research was guided by my hypothesis that, since (im)polite-
ness1 as a concept that has some currency within a given culture/cultural set-
ting has been so radically rethought in the past ten years, there would be many
examples of research questions that are being asked today that could not have
been asked in the context of earlier theorizations. I had also assumed that these
re-theorizations would have generated new methodologies. However when I
returned to Brown and Levinson’s (Brown and Levinson 1987 [1978]) theoriza-
tion of politeness and to earlier examples of politeness scholarship, I was struck
anew by some of the general principles underlying the theory and the extent
to which, from the beginning, the theory has generated a wide range of sophis-
ticated research questions. It was also clear that these questions had led to
some carefully crafted analyses that were not slavishly designed to reinforce
the claims of the theory. However they addressed questions which could not,
without that theory, have been asked in the first place. An excellent example
of such a study is Blum-Kulka’s (1990) cross-cultural analysis of family dis-
course. I also became increasingly aware as I was looking for points of contrast
that many of the research questions that I thought could only have been asked
today could also have been generated by the original theory.
1 I use small capitals here to indicate that I am referring to the concept rather than the
word politeness. That conceptualization might be realized as part of a theory or be a lay
conceptualization.
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I therefore modified the aims of this paper and, although I do chart devel-
opments in the field by pointing to new research questions and consider the
methods that have been developed in order to address those questions, I do so
in the context of a broader argument that emerged from my survey of develop-
ments in politeness research. My aim here is to argue that there is a key
strength in the original theorization of politeness that it is important to retain
as developments in the field continue: politeness research should balance the
pragmatic with the sociolinguistic. I hope therefore that readers who are new
to politeness research, as well as those who are familiar with scholarship in
the field, will find it useful to reflect on the intellectual foundations of the
approaches that are currently being developed on this tenth anniversary of the
publication of the first issue of the Journal of Politeness Research so that the
quality of future research can equal the quality of past research.
In what follows I consider Brown and Levinson’s argument for an approach
to politeness phenomena that engages with both sociolinguistics and pragmat-
ics. They initiate this argument by articulating a goal that remains relevant for
politeness research today: “The key problem in sociolinguistics is always the
origin and nature of the social valence attached to a linguistic form” (Brown
and Levinson 1987: 280). Their subsequent argument that “sociolinguistics
should be applied pragmatics” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 281) arises from their
proposal that a sociolinguistic investigation that addresses politeness behav-
iour from a pragmatic perspective is one way in which one aspect of that key
problem can be addressed. In the next two sections I consider what it has
meant in the past and what it means today for politeness research to constitute
a sociolinguistic application of pragmatics.
In invoking Brown and Levinson’s work, my argument here should not be
read as a call to a return to the original theory since, as I show in what follows,
the Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]) theory is premised on a pragmatics and
a sociolinguistics that is very different to the current manifestations of those
fields. My point is that, as pragmatics and sociolinguistics evolve, politeness
research should retain a balanced connection with the two fields. If we engage
with the sociolinguistic without taking into account the pragmatic, and vice
versa, we will lose one of the great sustaining strengths of politeness research.
In order to argue this point, in section two below I summarize some key devel-
opments in sociolinguistics and in section three I summarize developments in
pragmatics. In section four I consider the importance of politeness research
that has both a pragmatic and a sociolinguistic basis.
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2 The sociolinguistics of politeness research
Brown and Levinson’s proposition that sociolinguistics should be applied prag-
matics means something quite different today compared to what it meant in
1978, when their theory was initially published, and in 1987 when their theory
was republished with a section that addressed the critical responses that their
original work had generated. Here I summarize some of the reasons that Brown
and Levinson give for proposing that investigations into politeness phenomena
should have a sociolinguistic dimension. I also consider some of the differences
between the sociolinguistics Brown and Levinson are referring to and the scope
of sociolinguistics today.
Given the date of the original theory, when they argue that sociolinguistics
should be applied pragmatics, it is perhaps surprising that Brown and Levinson
are not referring to (what has come to be known as) variationist sociolinguis-
tics. They do say, in the context of a claim that politeness phenomena fall
within the scope of pragmatics, that “the special interest of sociolinguistics in
our view is in the differential use of such pragmatic resources by different
categories of speakers in different situations” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 281).
To this extent their conceptualization of social identity as existing separate
from and prior to language-use is a product of its time. It is not distinct from
that assumed by variationist sociolinguists in that it predates the constructivist
conceptualizations of social identity that inform sociolinguistics today. How-
ever, this extended version of one of the above quotations indicates that they
see the variationist model as offering too simplistic an account of how social
meanings are assigned to linguistic resources:
The key problem in sociolinguistics is always the origin and nature of the social valence
attached to linguistic form. Some sociolinguists view this as a relatively unmediated attri-
bution of value on the basis of the social value of the group with which the linguistic
forms are associated (Labov 1972c; Trudgill 1974a) (Brown and Levinson 1987: 280).
My point here is to show that it is on the basis of the premise that a given
linguistic resource does not have a specific ‘social valence’2 that can be derived
from its association with a specific demographic grouping, that Brown and Levin-
son develop their argument that the ‘attribution of value’ requires a pragmatic
analysis. As such, I’d argue that the specific sociolinguistics they are referring
to is a form of interactional, qualitative sociolinguistics rather than a survey-
2 The meaning of the term valence here is not self-evident. I take it to mean ‘power’ or
‘capacity’ in that what it appears to refer to is the potential function of a linguistic resource.
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based quantitative sociolinguistics. And although its conceptualization of social
identity and meaning generation are different to those of today’s sociolinguis-
tics, its goal is not inconsistent with the methodological drivers of third-wave
sociolinguists today (see Eckert 2008, 2012) with their concern to investigate
the dynamic nature of the social construction of meaning. And nor is it incon-
sistent with the focus on evaluative commentary in much recent politeness
research.
Now, clearly, since Brown and Levinson’s theory proposes that certain puta-
tive acts are inherently face-threatening, and since this premise has long been
challenged, the research questions their theory generates are unlikely to be the
same as those asked by current studies. Their position is evident in the state-
ment that, for them, “communicative intentions have built-in social implica-
tions, often of a threatening sort” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 281). Moreover,
their assumption that certain linguistic resources will generate politeness impli-
catures is predicated on a theory of communication that does not hold today. I
will address this in more detail in the next section, but here, the point I want
to make is that although most current politeness researchers would disagree
with many of the premises underlying Brown and Levinson’s version of polite-
ness theory, the assumption that the goal of politeness research is to investigate
the social values attributed to linguistic forms, and not to assume that they can
be uncontroversially read off by the analyst, is as valid now as it was then. And
I believe that this aspect of the framework should continue to guide politeness
researchers.
The authors articulate the need to account explicitly for the meanings that
are attributed to interactional phenomena in the following argument (which,
interestingly, does not distinguish between the practices of anthropologists and
sociolinguists):
Another point of immediate sociological relevance is methodological: anthropologists
routinely make inferences about the nature of social relationships by observations of
their interactional quality. They do this unreflectingly, on the basis of implicit assumptions
about universal principles of face-to-face interaction. When made explicit these amount to
principles like those here described. Until sociological methodology is explicit, descrip-
tions will have an uncertain status and must be taken on the assumption that other
observers so placed would similarly observe (Brown and Levinson 1987: 55 [emphasis
mine]).
In the italicized elements of this quotation, Brown and Levinson are making
the point that inferences about meaning carried out by scholars are not sup-
ported by evidence and argument because they are assumed to be uncontrover-
sial and self-evident to all observers. They are also, of course, claiming that
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their own theory would allow these inferences to be appropriately supported.
Whether it does or does not is not the issue here, however. My point is that if
those italicized sentences were removed, the general principle that Brown and
Levinson are arguing is one that still holds today, even though it is not always
followed. My belief is that one reason why politeness research developed into
an established field of inquiry is because the best examples have followed the
principle that any sociolinguistic account of the meaning of interactional data
has to be supported with an account that explains how such inferences are
arrived at (whether or not the theory that accounts for those inferences is
Brown and Levinson’s).
Given this proposal that a strength of politeness research is the explanatory
level that it adds to sociolinguistic data, what does it mean to investigate polite-
ness as a pragmatic phenomenon that has a sociolinguistic dimension in 2015?
To take just one development as an example, third wave variationist sociolin-
guistics is the product of a revision of the aims and methods of earlier forms
of variation studies. The current concern is to investigate how the social mean-
ings of linguistic resources are dynamically, and locally, generated (see in par-
ticular Eckert 2008 and 2012). A major premise of the current framework that
Eckert (2008: 455) articulates is: “the meanings of variables are not precise or
fixed but rather constitute a field of potential meanings”. She glosses this field
of potential meanings as “an indexical field, or constellation of ideologically
related meanings, any one of which can be activated in the situated use of
the variable”. She argues that participation in discourse involves a continual
interpretation of forms in context; an in-the-moment assigning of indexical val-
ues to linguistic forms. Her point is that whenever a linguistic resource is used,
it has the potential to change its indexical field, and therefore the social mean-
ings of linguistic resources are never entirely fixed. However, citing Silverstein
(2003), she points out that meanings are ‘always already immanent’ because
they take place within an ideological field, albeit one that is fluid and ever-
changing (Eckert 2008: 464).
To see politeness as having a sociolinguistic dimension in 2015 therefore is
very different to that in 1978. It is premised on the assumption that the social
meanings of linguistic resources are far more unstable than would have been
envisaged at the time Brown and Levinson first developed their theory. Al-
though it is assumed by the current framework that there are ideological con-
straints on the meaning potential of resources, and therefore that the meaning
potential has a structured variation, third wave variationist sociolinguistics also
theorizes the possibility of change through its focus on locally generated mean-
ings that challenge the ideological constraints. The key goal of sociolinguistics
that Brown and Levinson articulated remains a pertinent goal for current re-
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search, therefore: to account for the origin and nature of the social valence
attached to linguistic form.
I would argue that politeness research is highly pertinent to this agenda as
it is designed to provide a pragmatic account that can be used to investigate
the meaning capacity of specific linguistic resources in specific contexts of use.
It provides one way in which the field can build on and contribute to develop-
ments in sociolinguistics as well as strengthen the field of politeness research
itself.
3 The pragmatic element of politeness research
Pragmatics in 1978 was also a very different field to that of 2015. As many
critiques of Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory have pointed out, in 1978,
the dominant pragmatic framework was the Gricean model. I have argued else-
where (Christie 2007) how the Gricean framework enabled and constrained the
development of the original theory, so will rehearse this relationship very brief-
ly here in order to show how a politeness theory today is embedded within
quite a different pragmatics and therefore generates quite distinct research
questions.
Although, between 1978 and 1987, the reliance of Brown and Levinson’s
theory of politeness on Gricean pragmatics had been heavily criticized, in the
1987 introduction to the theory the authors justify their retention of their origi-
nal Gricean framework thus: “the only essential presumption is what is at the
heart of Grice’s proposals, namely that there is a working assumption by con-
versationalists of the rational and efficient nature of talk” (Brown and Levinson
1987: 4). Their point is that Grice’s framework only informs their approach to
politeness at a relatively abstract level and therefore the original does not war-
rant revision. The basic presumption that interlocutors assume that talk is ra-
tional and efficient, that Brown and Levinson take from Gricean theory, appears
to be relatively uncontroversial and still holds for many pragmatic approaches
today. However, the implications that the authors draw from this presumption
(in the sentence following the above quotation) would only be generated by a
normative framework such as Grice’s:
It is against that assumption [i.e. of the rational and efficient nature of talk] that polite
ways of talking show up as deviations, requiring rational explanation on the part of the
recipient, who finds in considerations of politeness reasons for the speaker’s apparent
irrationality or inefficiency (Brown and Levinson 1987: 4).
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To be able to see the above statement as a corollary of the proposition that
precedes it requires an additional premise: that the criterion against which talk
is categorized as polite is a judgement about deviance. This in turn presupposes
that there are norms of non-deviance against which an utterance can be judged.
And, as many politeness theorists have since argued, these norms are now seen
to be what Grice’s maxims actually capture.
It is worth clarifying what is being stated here, as it will draw out some
key differences between the Gricean model and the models that inform current
pragmatics. According to the Gricean model, an utterance either is or is not
deviant. If it is not deviant, the speaker is abiding by the maxims that instanti-
ate the Co-operative Principle and is explicitly ‘saying’ what she ‘means’. If the
utterance is deviant, it is because the speaker is not following the maxims and
therefore is not ‘saying’ what she ‘means’. Since, according to the premises of
the theory, the hearer expects that talk will be ‘rational and efficient’, the
search for an implicature is triggered by this recognition that the utterance is
deviant because it is ‘indirect’. What Brown and Levinson add to this is that
where that deviation is seen to be motivated by a concern for face, the result
would be a politeness implicature.
There are a number of elements here that are untenable in the light of
developments in pragmatics since 1978. Most significantly, as a recent Interper-
sonal Pragmatics special issue of the Journal of Pragmatics demonstrates, there
is an increasing body of work that is predicated on the assumption that polite-
ness evaluations are highly variable. As Haugh’s paper in that issue (2013: 54)
argues, current research in (im)politeness raises the question of: “just whose
evaluations of im/politeness we are in fact analysing”. This assumption about
the variability of interpretations of linguistic resources is now a given in prag-
matics, and it derives from an acceptance of both the assumption that ‘norms’
are unstable and the assumption of linguistic undetermination can no longer
questioned. Although there have been many developments in pragmatics, this
single issue demonstrates that the pragmatics of today is not the pragmatics
that informed Brown and Levinson’s original theory, and shows why their theo-
ry is not workable today: if it is no longer assumed that a speaker can explicitly
‘say’ what she ‘means’, there can be no binary opposition between directness
and indirectness that leads to a recognition of deviance, and therefore indirect-
ness does not account for the generation of politeness implicatures.
However, as I argue in the previous section, even though the overall theory
itself is no longer tenable, there are strong reasons for maintaining the link
between the sociolinguistic and the pragmatic upon which Brown and Levin-
son’s theory is predicated. The analytical framework that Brown and Levinson
propose is a tool for describing “the quality of social relations” (Brown and
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Levinson 1987: 55). It is pragmatic (in the authors’ own terms) because it in-
volves an engagement with “the systematic relation of a language to context”
Brown and Levinson 1987: 55). It is sociolinguistic because it asks questions
about “the origin and nature of the social valence attached to a linguistic form”
(Brown and Levinson 1987: 55). The theory aims therefore at offering both de-
scription (of patterns of behaviour) and explanation (what the function of that
behaviour might be given the claims of their theory).
In the light of developments in the way that the pragmatics of social inter-
action is perceived, research questions that are asked in studies of (im)polite-
ness increasingly relate to participants’ evaluations of interactional behaviour
and depend less on the analyst’s application of a theoretical framework. There
is a growing focus on metapragmatic comment as a source of understanding,
both in the analysis of the interactional data, and in the analysis of post-inter-
action interview data. Such studies are designed to draw out the evaluations
of participants as well as to assess the grounds for their evaluations. Mills,
explains this development in this issue as follows:
Brown and Levinson take the (implicit) stance that it is unproblematic for analysts to
evaluate the utterances of a speaker in a slightly decontextualized way, thus relying on
the idea that utterances are inherently meaningful, and overlooking the hearer’s under-
standing of the utterance. Instead, a discursive approach stresses the notion that meaning
can be dynamically constructed by multiple participants over the course of longer stretch-
es of discourse (Mills this issue: 182–183).
To this extent it is clear that in many ways the pragmatic underpinnings of
current approaches to (im)politeness research are consistent with contemporary
sociolinguistic concerns: the assumption that what counts as politeness is not
shared by all participants, but that politeness is a quality assigned to an utter-
ance in the process of an interaction, fits well with the concerns of third wave
sociolinguistics and with other contributions to this issue. They are evident in
Kadar and Marquez-Reiter’s (this issue) focus on the articulated legitimizations
of speakers who intervene in perceived wrong-doings. And in Dynel’s (this is-
sue) mapping of impoliteness research, the problem of assessing evaluations is
raised, with a particular focus on the problems of assessing evaluations of in-
tention. This matter is also addressed in detail in Mitchell and Haugh’s (this
issue) analysis of construal of intention in their data.
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4 Conclusion
I argued above that Brown and Levinson’s theory aims to be both pragmatic
and sociolinguistic in that it offers both description (of patterns of behaviour)
and explanation (what the function of that behaviour might be given the claims
of their theory). Although that explanation is no longer provided by a wholesale
application of their model, by proposing that the study of linguistic politeness
is one way in which sociolinguistics can function as applied pragmatics, Brown
and Levinson opened up a robust and extensive field of research. I would argue
that one reason why politeness research has developed into such a strong field
of inquiry is because, as the field has grown, the best examples of research
have followed the principle that any sociolinguistic account of the meaning of
interactional data has to be supported with an account that explains how such
inferences are arrived at. However, in ending this epilogue, I would like to pose
two questions: since, as I have shown here, the pragmatics and the sociolin-
guistics of 2015 have arrived at a point where both focus on the dynamic and
local generation of meaning, has this led to an over-emphasis on what is dy-
namic and local about the process of meaning-making rather than on what is
social and shared about the process? And does this matter?
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